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Reflective Essay
My research paper on Mozi started as a primary source analysis for my Religious Studies
Directed Reading seminar, Disputing the Way in Early China. As part of the assignment, I
revised my first draft, which I wrote solely based on Philip Ivanhoe’s translation of Mozi’s text,
incorporating feedback from Professor Zhiru and my classmates as well as secondary sources by
A.C. Graham and Benjamin Schwartz. Professor Zhiru also gave me Burton Watson’s
translation of the text for reference. In the process of revision, I realized that Watson’s
translation of Mozi’s central idea as “universal love” conveys the concept better than Ivanhoe’s
translation “impartiality”. Professor Zhiru also suggested that looking at Chinese sources might
be helpful to my research since I am fluent in both Chinese and English languages. Hence, I
went to the library to look for more sources to deepen my understanding of the text and learn
more about the implication of reading a text in translation.
My library research started with inputting “Mozi” in the search box on library website’s
front page. I was pleasantly surprised to find that the library has a plethora of primary and
secondary sources in both Chinese and English, some by famous Chinese scholars who studied
Mozi over a hundred years ago and others published recently by scholars writing in English.
A digitized book that I accessed online, Mozi as an Evolving Text, provides useful
context for my analysis. In class, we read A. C. Graham’s Disputers of the Tao, a piece of fine
secondary scholarship that proposes the “Three-Sects Theory” to explain internal inconsistencies
in Mozi. Graham attributes different chapters to different interpretations by competing sects of
Mohist thought. Prior to undertaking the library research, I had taken Graham’s theory as
absolute and my essay was previously centered on the extent to which I should ascribe all textual
inconsistencies to the differences among Mohist sects. It was not until reading this online book
that I began to entertain other theories to explain the seemingly diversification in the text of
Mozi. Mozi as an Evolving Text discusses Taeko Brooks’ “Sequence Theory”, which attributes
the text’s internal inconsistencies to developments over time, and compares it to Watanabe
Takashi’s “Alternative Evolution Theory”. As a first-year college student entering the world of
academic discourse, I became aware of how scholars engage in dialogues with each other through
Takashi’s analysis of the similarities and tensions across the three predominant theories in Mozi
studies. Mozi as an Evolving Text also warns me against assuming and therefore looking for

unity in the treatments of different chapters in Mozi, which I originally expected in my first
reading of the primary source.
Another helpful secondary source I found through my library online search was a Ph.D.
dissertation thesis on Mozi written by a doctoral candidate named Gunnar Sjöholm at Lund
University, Sweden in 1981. I was able to request this item via interlibrary loan. This find is
particularly exciting not only in terms of contents, but also because it provides me with inspiring
glimpses of what graduate students accomplish at the end of their academic careers and their
potential contributions to scholarship. Sjöholm pays close attention to the original Chinese
ideographs in his analysis of Mozi’s text, an aspect of the primary source that I initially neglected
when reading it in translation. Bringing in other scholars’ studies of graphic elements of Chinese
characters, Sjöholm employs the method of “Metaphorical Associative Word Field” to explain
the meaning of key words in Mozi’s text. Sjöholm’s thesis adds significant depth to my
understanding of Mozi because much of the original Chinese ideographs’ richness cannot be
fully encapsulated by different English translations of the words.
Furthermore, Sjöholm discusses Mozi’s artisan-class background in the light of the text’s
plain literary style that starkly contrasts with the writings of other elite philosophers who were
Mozi’s contemporaries. Sjöholm’s contextualization of Mozi’s socioeconomic background is
especially beneficial and critical to restructuring my interpretations of his utilitarian principles
and the examples he deploys to advance his arguments. Sjöholm’s comparison of Mozi’s text with
“The Analects” (by Confucius) also helps me further ground my reading of Mozi within broader
confluences of early Chinese thought.
Locating the print books from my search results, I made my first trip to the Asian
Library at Honnold and was completely amazed by the resources I encountered there. Aside
from books on Mozi, I saw traditionally bound volumes of bureaucratic reports with yellowing
paper and meticulous ink writing from over a century ago as well as contemporary literature that
I had been wanting to read since graduating from middle school in China. A Chinese secondary
source on Mozi written by Liang Qichao, a Chinese scholar, proved to be most helpful in my
research.
Writing during a time of political turmoil and social unrest in early twentieth century
China, Liang provides alternative interpretations to contextualize Mozi compared to western
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scholars. Liang determines that Mozi’s philosophy arose out of challenges to Confucian
doctrines and suggests different groupings of Mozi’s chapters. In addition, Liang argues that the
chapters on Heaven and spirits in the text are in fact motivated by Mozi’s desperation to use
superstition as a persuasion tactic rather than by Mozi’s genuine belief in supernatural forces.
This analysis aligns with the acceptance of scientific proofs and the rejection of religious
elements that modern Chinese intellectuals during Liang’s time tended toward. Recognizing this
broader pattern in interpretations, I realized that I have to keep in mind the ways in which a
scholar’s background might mold one’s reading of classical sources.
Liang’s usage of the original text’s language avoids the problem of translating Mozi’s
central idea into “impartiality” or “universal love”. In writing my paper on Mozi in English, it
was helpful to compare the treatments of important Chinese terms by different scholars and the
implication of various translations. In the case of this particular term, Sjöholm’s graphical
approach suggests understanding the concept as “joint action”, which complements the meanings
of different translations.
The process of researching Mozi taught me important lessons of comparing secondary
sources and analyzing the text from multiple approaches. Especially for scholarship in translation,
it is crucial to take language into account in considering key terms’ meanings. The digitized book,
the interlibrary loan service, as well as the Religious Studies Librarian Holly Gardinier were
extremely helpful to my research process. Furthermore, the Asian Library collection was the
most valuable resource to my research on Chinese philosophy. A comprehensive comparative
investigation of different versions of Chinese primary sources and of different translations by
English-speaking scholars over the years would be a good future project to undertake given the
library resources.
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Mozi (c. 480-390 B.C.E.) was a Chinese philosopher from the Warring States period in
early Chinese history whose utilitarianism contrasted with Confucian and Daoist thought.
Through reading the Mohist text in translation, I examined the relationship between two central
principles in Mozi’s philosophy: Heaven’s standard universal love and human action. Mozi
builds his arguments in the framework of a sociopolitical hierarchy that incorporates utilitarian
analyses of customs, morality, and beliefs in ghosts and spirits. By comparing secondary sources
in English and Chinese, reading different translations, and learning from graphical analysis of the
text’s key terms’ original Chinese ideographs, I concluded that in Mozi’s philosophy, human
action is the necessary agent to carry out Heaven’s will of universal love for the ultimate goal of
benefitting all people.
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Mozi: Universal Love and Human Agency
“Heaven made it come to pass that [the sage-kings] each became the Son of Heaven and
were given the wealth of all the world.”1 In Chapter 26 (“Heaven’s Will”), Mozi (c. 480-390
B.C.E.) ascribes Heaven the power of appointing the head of the sociopolitical hierarchy in the
human world. However, Mozi gives another account in Chapter Eleven (“Obeying One’s
Superior”): “[the people] chose the best person among the most worthy and capable in the world
and established him as the Son of Heaven.”2 This alternative theory of the origin of government
suggests a bottom-up, rather than top-down selection of the Son of Heaven. In this account, the
people have their sense of moral judgment to choose a ruler.3 This juxtaposition poses the
question of the relationship between Heaven and people: is Heaven an external entity imposing
morality on human endeavors, or an extension of human tendency to prefer righteousness and
universal love? This question must be investigated in the context of Mozi’s sociopolitical
hierarchy in which Heaven lords over the Son of Heaven, who governs the people. In this system,
Heaven’s will, universal love, is carried out through human agency for the purpose of benefitting
all people.
According to Mozi, Heaven’s standard does not originate from the people. Even “the
most honored person in the world and the richest person in the world”, the Son of Heaven, “does

1

Mozi, “Chapter Twenty-Six: Heaven’s Will,” in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, ed. Philip J.
Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, trans. Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company,
Inc., 2001), 92.
2
Ibid., “Chapter Eleven: Obeying One’s Superior,” 65.
3
Ibid.
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not make up his own standard.”4 Because occupants of higher position in Mozi’s framework of
hierarchy are deemed more “righteous” and “wise”, they serve as models to their inferiors.5 This
line of reasoning applies to the people following the Son of Heaven, and also to the Son of
Heaven obeying his superior. “Heaven is pure eminence and pure wisdom. Therefore
righteousness in fact originates with Heaven.”6 Although universal love is not synonymous with
righteousness, both are moral standards and natural tendencies that according to Mozi, are
decrees of Heaven.
Heaven enforces its will through rewards and punishments in a way comparable to how
the Son of Heaven governs people with incentives and deterrents.7 Mozi clearly states this
relationship: “the way in which Heaven holds possession of the world is no different from the
way in which a ruler or a feudal lord holds possession of all within the four borders of his
domain.”8 Hence, Heaven is simultaneously an external force from which the standard of
universal love originates and a personified participant in the sociopolitical hierarchy that guides
his subordinates.
Heaven sets a standard for the Son of Heaven, who then “unifies norms” for the people.9
It is upon the people to choose to accord with Heaven’s will, universal love, rather than going
against it. In Chapter Sixteen (“Impartial Caring”), Mozi engages in extensive reasoning to argue
that universal love (or impartiality) should be people’s standard for “choosing one’s ruler”.10
This attempt to convince people of the righteous choice indicates that execution of Heaven’s will
4

Ibid. “Chapter Twenty-Six: Heaven’s Will,” 91-92.
Mozi, “The Will of Heaven, Part II (Section 27),” in Mo Tzu: Basic Writings, trans. Burton Watson (New
York/London: Columbia University Press, 1963), 84.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid., 86.
9
Ibid., “Chapter Eleven, Obeying One’s Superior,” 67.
10
Mozi, “Chapter Sixteen: Impartial Caring,” trans. Philip J. Ivanhoe in Readings in Classical Chinese
Philosophy, 71.
5
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depends on human agents. Though originated from Heaven, universal love is a human act
practiced by former sage-kings rather than a supernatural one like “picking up Mount Tai and
carrying it across the Chang Jiang.”11 In Mozi’s hierarchy, the superior sets and enforces a
standard, and the inferior emulates the example of his superior. This relationship is Mozi’s ideal
of government and also the role Heaven plays in governing the Son of Heaven. As Schwartz
points out, “human actors basing themselves on Heaven as a ‘model’ will play the decisive role
in shaping the future” in Mozi’s philosophy.12 This is the interactive relationship between
Heaven and the people.
Despite the implication of election based on merit in Chapter Eleven, people are expected
to obey their superiors once the ruler is chosen. Here, human agency within the structure appears
to be limited. In other words, the ultimate authority lies in the system of hierarchy. Mozi invokes
the acts of sage-kings who “wanted to make clear to the people of the world that Heaven governs
the Son of Heaven” to prove Heaven’s supreme position and urge people to obey Heaven’s
will.13 The principle of upward conformity holds the hierarchy firm. Communal interest depends
on the orderly structure of society and right leadership.
Mozi’s utopian ideal of social order is not simply top-down or bottom-up, but grounded
in the underlying assumption of reciprocity. In Chapter Sixteen (“Impartial Caring”), Mozi
formulates his argument for preferring universal love over partiality around reciprocal human
interactions. “One must first care for and benefit the parents of others in order to expect that they
in turn will respond by caring for and benefitting one’s own parents” is the reason Mozi offers to
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Ibid., “Chapter Sixteen: Impartial Caring,” 72.
Benjamin I. Schwartz, “Mo-tzu’s Challenge,” The World of Thought in Ancient China
(Cambridge/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 162.
13
Mozi, “Chapter Twenty-Six: Heaven’s Will,” trans. Philip J. Ivanhoe in Readings in Classical Chinese
Philosophy, 91.
12
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explain that universal love is more beneficial to oneself and the people collectively than filial
piety.14
The idea of reciprocity also applies to the relationship between people and Heaven. “If I
do what Heaven desires, then Heaven will do what I desire.”15 This claim could be read in
conjunction with Heaven’s mechanism of reward and punishment: “those who accord with
Heaven’s will, caring for one another impartially, and benefitting one another in their
interactions, will surely be rewarded.”16 Although people have the autonomy to act, their agency
is limited to actions in accordance with Heaven’s will, otherwise they would face consequences.
The interest of people aligns with the will of Heaven because the ultimate goal of
universal love is to benefit all people. Because Heaven “lays claim to all people”, it desires
prosperity for them just as the Son of Heaven wants wealth and peace for his subjects.17 In both
cases, the leader’s concern is meant for the people collectively, not directed at individuals.
Heaven would punish one person to preserve justice and order for the benefit of all people.18
Heaven judges merits of people and deeds by their contribution to the collective interest, so the
Son of Heaven and the people, taking Heaven’s will as their model, should adopt this utilitarian
standard as a guideline of conduct.
Mozi identifies three specific objectives of government: to “enrich the poor, increase the
population, bring stability to precarious situations and order to chaos.”19 These are goals of the
Son of Heaven for a state and what Heaven desires of all people. In Mozi’s reasoning, the utility
of different alternatives is measured by their abilities to contribute to the three purposes that
14
15
16
17
18
19

Ibid., “Chapter Sixteen: Impartial Caring,” 75.
Ibid., “Chapter Twenty-Six: Heaven’s Will,” 91.
Ibid., 92-93.
Ibid,
Ibid.
Ibid., “Chapter Twenty-Five: For Moderation in Funerals,” 87.
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embody the benefit of all people. This view places usefulness as the ultimate end in Mozi’s
philosophy, relegating other institutions to the status of means. “If the people of the world all
obey their superiors on up to the Son of Heaven but do not obey Heaven, then Heavenly disasters
still will not cease.”20 Upward conformity within the hierarchy has to accord with Heaven’s will
and serve the benefit of all people. Hence, rather than an end in itself, the hierarchical system is
the instrument through which the Son of Heaven and the people can carry out Heaven’s will.
Rising from the craftsman class, Mozi advocates for “rank awarded on the basis of virtue”
in Chapter Eight (“Honoring the Worthy”) because it strengthens the effectiveness of the
hierarchy and contributes to governance in accordance with Heaven’s will; his motivation is not
pure moral affinity for meritocracy or social mobility. Mozi presents the examples of sage-kings
elevating able people of humble origin to high positions in the bureaucracy because of the
usefulness of such acts. Meritocracy can “promote public righteousness and prevent private
resentment.”21 It is for constructing a stable society to serve the benefit of all people rather than
personal fairness. Mozi’s discourse on meritocracy suggests his egalitarianism, but more
importantly, it reveals his commitment to utilitarianism. Equality, or even moral standards, are
only desired in their usefulness. As Schwartz suggests, Mozi is concerned with “doing good”
rather than “being good”.22
Mozi’s pragmatism is most pronounced in his attitude toward so-called tradition.
Although he often cites the sage-kings as examples for contemporary rulers to emulate like “The
Analects” does, Mozi does not value antiquity for its own sake. He takes a critical approach to
customs and follows only those that lead to “the way to realize what is benevolent and what is

20

Ibid., “Chapter Eleven: Obeying One’s Superior,” 67.
Ibid., “Chapter Eight: Honoring the Worthy,” 64,
22
Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 146.
21
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right.”23 Music, an important part of Confucian rites, is condemned by Mozi because it “does not
promote the benefit of people in the world today.”24 Activities that in the Confucian worldview
relate to moral cultivation such as rituals and music are judged by their usefulness to increase
wealth and population for the benefit of all people in Mozi’s philosophy. As Liang Qichao
explains in A Critical Survey of Mo Tzu, everything Mozi advocates stems from the principle of
universal love, and the practical aspect of this theory lies in mutual benefit and utility for all.25
Mozi’s view on mourning rituals provides an example of his utilitarian analysis of
traditions and rites. He rejects practices of “lavish funerals and prolonged mourning” because
“the state would be poor, the people few, and the government in chaos” as a consequence.26
Mozi’s method of investigation in reaching this conclusion further illustrates his standard.
Because his ultimate concern is tangible economic achievements, Mozi reasons in these terms.
Graham points out “the three tests of argument” that Mozi employs to argue his claims: “finding
the assertion’s root, the evidence for it, and the use of it.”27 Mozi believed that once acquainted
with the right evidence, people would correct their thinking and act accordingly. In prescribing
social norms, Mozi does not merely appeal to the authority of “tradition” but judges their
consequences with regard to bringing wealth, population, and order, which is what Heaven
desires for its people. The sage-king Yu “launched a campaign to rectify the ruler of the Miao
was not because he wanted to increase his wealth and honor, earn for himself additional favors
and blessings… but because he wanted to contribute to the benefit of the world and eliminate

23

Mozi, “Chapter Twenty-Five: For Moderation in Funerals,” trans. Philip J. Ivanhoe in Readings in
Classical Chinese Philosophy, 88.
24
Ibid., “Chapter Thirty-Two: A Condemnation of Musical Performances,” 105.
25
Liang Qichao, A Critical Survey of Mo Tzu (Shanghai: Commercial Press Limited, 1921), 16.
26
Mozi, “Chapter Twenty-Five: For Moderation in Funerals,” trans. Philip J. Ivanhoe in Readings in
Classical Chinese Philosophy, 85.
27
A.C. Graham, “A Radical Reaction: Mo-Tzu,” Disputers of the Tao (Peru: Open Court Publishing
Company, 1989), 37.
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what is harmful to it.”28 To Mozi, the sage-kings are exemplary rulers because their actions were
motivated by the intention to benefit all people, which was in accordance with Heaven’s will.
In a similar vein, Mozi denounces fatalism on the basis of its counter-productiveness.
“Fatalism brings no benefit to Heaven above, no benefit to the spirits in the middle realm, and no
benefit to mankind below” because it prevents people from “pursuing their tasks”.29 If the belief
in fatalism leads to “not enough wealth and goods”, it fails to meet the standard of Heaven and is
“the way of evil man”.30 Mozi examines the claim of fatalists by applying it to the three tests of
argument and emphasizes that human conduct is responsible for consequent rewards and
punishments. Such importance placed in human agency brings up the question of the role of
supernatural forces: Heaven above, and the ghosts and spirits in the middle realm.
In Mozi’s three-tiered system, Heaven is above ghosts and spirits, and all of them govern
the people. Heaven plays the role of the ultimate moral leader that monitors the Son of Heaven:
“If the Son of Heaven does something good, Heaven has the power to reward him, and if he does
something bad, Heaven has the power to punish him.”31 The sage-kings whose conduct
conformed to the expectations of this hierarchy “worked to promote what is beneficial to the
world and eliminate what is harmful.”32 Heaven has a will independent of human actions, but
this will is ultimately concerned with the welfare of people. As Schwartz suggests, the Son of
Heaven is “the active collaborator of Heaven” whose actions contribute to organizing Mozi’s
ideal productive society.33

28

Mozi, “Chapter Sixteen: Impartial Caring”, trans. Philip J. Ivanhoe in Readings in Classical Chinese
Philosophy, 73.
29
Mozi, trans. Watson in Mo Tzu: Basic Writings, 123.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid., 84.
32
Ibid., 87.
33
Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 145.
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Ghosts and spirits also enforce Heaven’s ideal by watching over human conduct and
responding with rewards and punishments. Mozi reasons in Chapter Thirty-One (“On Ghosts”)
that ghosts and spirits exist and “could reward the worthy and punish the wicked.”34 However,
ghosts and spirits do not have an agenda of their own outside of monitoring people’s actions to
ensure that “the world will be well-ordered.”35 In contrast with their ritual significance in “The
Analects”, ghosts and spirits are rather “perfunctory” in Mohist thought with little implication on
“the moral cultivation of individuals or communities”.36 Mozi discusses ghosts and spirits as
useful deterrents against harmful human actions. Hence Graham argues, “the function of Heaven
and the spirits in the Mohist scheme is to enforce the true morality by reward and punishment,”
and its spiritual dimension does not go deeper than utilitarianism.37
How does Heaven’s will, universal love, manifest in Mozi’s hierarchy, through the
relationships among Heaven, the Son of Heaven, and people? The sage-king Tang’s speech
demonstrates Mozi’s stance:
I, the little one, Lü, presume to use a dark-colored sacrifice to make my announcement to
the Lord of Heaven above. I declare that Heaven’s great drought is my responsibility. I
do not know if I have committed some offense against those above or below… The
judgment lies in your mind along, Lord! If those within my domain have committed any
offense, let the responsibility rest with me. If I have committed any offense, let the
responsibility not fall upon those within my domain.38
Mozi does not highlight Tang’s deference to Heaven in performing the sacrificial ritual, but
emphasizes the fact that Tang “did not hesitate to present himself as an offering” despite his

34

Mozi, “Chapter Thirty-One: On Ghosts,” trans. Philip J. Ivanhoe in Readings in Classical Chinese
Philosophy,103.
35
Ibid., 104.
36
Roel Sterckx, “Mozi 31: Explaining Ghosts, Again,” in Mozi as an Evolving Text: Different Voices in
Early Chinese Thought, ed. Carine Defoort and Nicolas Standaert (Leiden, NLD: Brill, 2013), 95-96.
37
Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 48.
38
Mozi, “Chapter Sixteen: Impartial Caring,” trans. Philip J. Ivanhoe in Readings in Classical Chinese
Philosophy, 73.
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position as the Son of Heaven and his wealth.39 Tang’s declaration to take responsibility for his
subjects’ wrongdoings reveals his commitment to benefit all his people, which is Mozi’s
message in this anecdote: “Such was the impartiality (or universal love) of Tang.”40 As the Son
of Heaven, Tang defers to Heaven as the ultimate judge and authority. Thus, human agency in
Mozi’s philosophy does not preclude the authority of Heaven because Heaven desires to benefit
all people, and universal love is the shared norm that Heaven, the Son of Heaven, and people
have in common.
Mozi’s call to action under the guiding principle of universal love operates in the
framework of a sociopolitical hierarchy with the ultimate moral leadership of Heaven. As
Sjöholm suggests, the Chinese ideograph for Heaven, composed of a horizontal stroke placed
above the ideograph for “the ‘great’ performer of rites,” demonstrates the hierarchical
relationship between Heaven and people.41 Likewise, a graphical analysis of what Graham
translates as “universal love” and Ivanhoe as “impartiality”, jian, reveals that the word could be a
pictorial representation of “two bundles in the hand,” which is related to the central Mohist idea
of “keeping all men together to further the greatest advantage for the sake of the whole.”42 For
Mozi, morality does not exist outside of utility. In his utopian vision, the Son of Heaven leads the
people to better the collective interest in an orderly, productive society. The hierarchical system,
like social practices and supernatural existence, does not exist for its own sake but serves the
purpose of carrying out Heaven’s will and benefitting all people. Although all people including
the Son of Heaven defer to Heaven as the originator and enforcer of its standard, the superior and

39

Ibid.
Ibid.
41
Gunnar Sjöholm, “Rreadings in Mo Ti, Chapters XXVI - XXVIII, On the Will of Heaven,” (Lund,
Sweden: Lund University, 1981), 212.
42
Ibid, 154.
40
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the inferior participants of the sociopolitical order have an interdependent relationship because
while the former presents a model, the latter’s actions materialize the ideal of universal love.
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